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• We investigate the effect of individualism/collectivism on fiscal redistribution.
• We instrument this cultural dimension by a set of genetic, epidemiological and linguistic data.
• Our analysis suggests that less collectivistic societies redistribute more.
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a b s t r a c t
Using a set of innovative instruments qualified by the literature, we investigate the effect of individualist
culture on fiscal redistribution. Our analysis suggests that societies characterized by less collectivistic
culture present higher levels of fiscal redistribution, as proxied by government subsidies and transfers as
well as health and education expenses.
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1. Introduction
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that cul-
ture affects economic outcomes and institutions within coun-
tries (see e.g., Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). However, contem-
poraneous culture might be endogenous to economic outcomes
and institutions. In a highly influential paper Gorodnichenko and
Roland (forthcoming) employ a set of innovative instruments to
address endogeneity concerns and, thus, establish a convincing
relationship between individualistic culture and growth.
Following the identification strategy of Gorodnichenko and
Roland (forthcoming), this work examines one dimension of cul-
ture that can be seen as relevant to welfare policies: individualism
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versus collectivism.1 Fiscal redistribution is proxied by government
subsidies and transfers, as well as health and education expenses
that entail a dimension of redistribution (Desmet et al., 2009). To
deal with the usual identification concerns, we instrument culture
1 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates directly the
relationship between individualism/collectivism and fiscal redistribution. However,
there are two parallel strands of the literature closely related to our analysis. The
first concentrates on the relationship between family structure and implemented
welfare policies (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1999), whereas the second investigates
the potential relationship between generalized trust (that is trust in ‘‘out-group’’
relationships) and welfare state (e.g., Berg and Bjørnskov, 2011). Both strands
chime with a negative relationship between collectivistic norms and welfare state.
More precisely, Esping-Andersen (1999) suggest that close family ties provide a
social security net to the individuals that otherwisewould beprovidedby the formal
state. Similarly, Berg and Bjørnskov (2011) argue that a higher level of generalized
trust –which is a basic characteristic of more individualistic societies – mitigates
the temptation of free riding and allows for the universal provision of public goods,
transfers and services.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.029
0165-1765/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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by a set of genetic, epidemiological and linguistic data that have
been linked empirically to this cultural dimension (see Kashima
and Kashima, 1998; Murray and Schaller, 2010; Way and Lieber-
man, 2010). Our analysis suggests that countries characterized by
higher levels of individualism present higher levels of redistributive
spending.
2. Data and theoretical considerations
Our data covers a wide cross-section of countries. The depen-
dent variables in our analysis are fiscal spending accounts, which
are used as proxies for redistribution by the relevant literature.
(e.g., Desmet et al., 2009). Specifically, we employ as dependent
variable interchangeably: (i) government subsidies and transfers
(% GDP) and (ii) health and education expenses (% GDP) from 1980
to 2004.2
The key explanatory variable in our analysis is culture. In par-
ticular, we focus on one dimension of culture: individualism ver-
sus collectivism. Individualism is a cultural trait that emphasizes
personal freedom and achievement and awards social status to
personal accomplishments that make an individual stand out. On
the other hand, collectivism emphasizes the embeddedness of indi-
viduals in larger groups and encourages conformity to ‘‘in-group’’
relationships (see Triandis, 1995). As a main proxy for individual-
istic/collectivistic culture, we employ the measure developed by
Hofstede (2001) with higher values indicatingmore individualistic
societies (denoted as individualism).
The theoretical relationship between this dimension of culture
and fiscal redistribution is a priori ambiguous. This is because, on
the one hand, welfare state is a formal risk sharing institution that
provides a safety net to ‘‘unlucky’’ individuals, whereas collectivis-
tic norms – such as strong family ties – serve as informal risk
sharing agreements that also protect individuals against risk (see
Esping-Andersen, 1999). According to this argument, collectivism
and welfare policies operate as substitutes and, thus, we should
expect a negative association between the two—or a positive one
between more individualism and redistribution. The reason is that,
in the absence of formal risk sharing institutions (i.e. before the
formation of welfare state), societies facing increased risks, such
as climate variability or a higher prevalence of lethal diseases,
developed informal insurance contracts (i.e. extended networks
of ‘‘in group’’ relationships) to tackle the issue of uncertainty (see
e.g. Murray and Schaller, 2010). For this reason, more collectivistic
(individualistic) societieswere in lower (higher) need of protection
from the state when welfare policies were put in place. On the
other hand, preferences for redistribution are endogenous to for-
mal institutions. Therefore, a larger (narrower) welfare state may
lead to collectivistic (individualistic) norms and hence increased
(decreased) demand for fiscal redistribution (see e.g., Alesina
and Fuchs-Schuendeln, 2007). If this is the case, collectivism and
redistributive policies will function as complements rather than
substitutes. Being theoretically ambiguous, an empirical investiga-
tion will shed more light on the sign of the association between
individualism and welfare policies.
3. Identification strategy
Our analysis relies on contemporaneous measures of culture
which might be endogenous to the implemented economic policy.
To address the usual endogeneity concerns, we employ a bat-
tery of alternative instruments that have been linked empirically
to this cultural dimension. Following Gorodnichenko and Roland
(forthcoming), our basic instrument is the Mahalanobis distance
between the frequency of blood types in a given country and
2 Data are obtained from the World Bank’sWorld Development Indicators (WDI).
the UK, which is the second most individualistic country in our
sample. Genetic markers are probably the cleanest instruments
by not being correlated to fiscal redistribution through any other
channel other than culture, thus satisfying the exclusion restric-
tion. We denote this as blood distance from the UK. Employing
this instrument has two major advantages. First, blood distance
from the UK is a neutral genetic marker that allows us to rule out
reverse causality concerns. This is because different blood types
are not expected to affect intelligence and output. Second, the
frequency of alleles determining blood types is a widely available
genetic information that ensures a large number of cross-country
observations. Fig. 1 plots government transfers along with health
and educational expenses against blood distance from the UK. As
can be seen, reduced-form relationships indicate that countries
further away in terms of blood distance from the UK present a lower
level of redistributive spending. It must be stressed that the use of
genetic data does not surmise any causal effect between genetic
and cultural distance. Genetic markers are used exclusively as a
proxy for transmission of cultural traits from parents to offspring.
In other words, our analysis seeks to exploit the stylized fact that
culture is transmitted from parents to offspring (similarly to the
genes) and takes the advantage of this correlation between cultural
and genetic transmission to investigate the cultural distances that
cannot be proxied in a more direct way (see also Gorodnichenko
and Roland, forthcoming). Likewise, we also employ the G allele
in polymorphism A118G in the µ-opioid receptor gene that leads
to higher stress in case of social rejection (denoted as A118G). Ac-
cording toWay and Lieberman (2010) A118G is strongly correlated
to the collectivistic traits that provide psychological protection
from social rejection. Unfortunately, cross-country coverage for
this variable is limited, which qualifies blood distance from the UK
as our main instrument.
We also use the epidemiological data on pathogen prevalence
put together by Murray and Schaller (2010)—denoted as pathogen
prevalence. The rationale behind the use of epidemiological data is
that stronger pathogen prevalence pushed communities to follow
collectivist traits that emphasize the embeddedness of individuals
to ‘‘in-group’’ relationships and set limits to openness towards
foreigners (e.g., Murray and Schaller, 2010).
Apart from the genetic and epidemiological data, we employ
the linguistic variable on pronoun drop developed by Davis and
Abdurazokzoda (2016) as an instrument for cultural emphasis on
autonomy rather than on in-group embeddedness. According to
Kashima and Kashima (1998), the requirement to use pronouns in
a language or the license to drop them is linked to the degree of
psychological differentiation between the speaker and the social
context of speech, including the conversation partner. Therefore,
the linguistic practice of ‘‘pronoun drop’’ reveals a cultural di-
mension of central interest, namely the relationship between the
individual and the group. Cultures with pronoun drop languages
tend to be less individualistic. In turn, we employ the linguistic
variable language developed by Tabellini (2008) that accounts both
for the pronoun drop and 2nd person differentiation (the so-called
‘‘T–V distinction’’). Linguists point out that this T–V distinction is
associated with cultures that pay close attention to the hierarchy
of interpersonal relations. Therefore, cultures with T–V distinction
languages tend to be less individualistic (seeKashima andKashima,
1998).3
4. Results
Table 1 presents the OLS and IV estimates for the effect of
individualism on fiscal redistribution when the latter is proxied
3 The remaining reduced-form scatter plots between our instruments and redis-
tributive spending are available at the end of the Appendix.
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Fig. 1. Reduced form relationship between blood distance from the UK and governmental transfers and between blood distance from the UK health and education expanses.
by: (i) government subsidies and transfers (% GDP) [Panel A]; and
health and education expenses (% GDP) [Panel B]. Even columns
of Table 1 control also for the level of development, as proxied
by GDP per capita. The first stage results in columns (3)–(12) for
the data described above indicate that the coefficients have the
expected sign and are highly significant. Moreover, as can be easily
verified individualism enters with a positive and highly significant
coefficient in all alternative specifications. We interpret this em-
pirical finding in the following way. In collectivistic societies, ‘‘in-
group’’ relationships (i.e., stronger family ties) act as a substitute of
formal risk sharing institutions (i.e., welfare state). These informal
risk sharing agreements provide a safety net against risk that
makes the redistributive policy of the state less necessary and
consequently the demand for redistribution weaker. Obviously,
the opposite holds for societies characterized by higher levels of
individualism.
Table 2 presents OLS and IV estimates for the basic instrument
of our analysis, namely blood distance from the UK, when employing
a set of extended controls to account for other potential confound-
ing factors (seeDesmet et al., 2009). Thus,we control for: continen-
tal effects, legal origins, percentages of religious affiliation, popu-
lation, share of population above 65, ethno-linguistic fractionaliza-
tion and absolute latitude. Economic and demographic controls are
obtained from the WDI, whereas the remaining controls (i.e., ge-
ographical variables, legal origins, major religions etc.) are taken
from Gorodnichenko and Roland (forthcoming). Evidently, indi-
vidualism enters again with a positive and significant coefficient
in all alternative estimates. It should be noted that when these
controls are incorporated in the specifications of the alternative in-
struments presented in Table 1, it turns out that blood distance from
the UK displays by far the strongest first stage results. In additional
robustness checks, we have replaced redistributive expenses with
tax variables (e.g., direct taxes (% of GDP)), and the results, although
weaker, provide further evidence in favor of a positive relationship
between individualism and fiscal redistribution. Finally, our results
are insensitive to dropping one continent at a time.4
5. Conclusions
Building on the identification strategy employed by Gorod-
nichenko and Roland (forthcoming) this study seeks to provide
evidence for the association between culture and welfare policies.
Our empirical findings suggest that countries characterized by
more individualistic cultural values present higher levels of fiscal
redistribution.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.029.
4 All unreported results are available on the online Appendix.
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Table 1
The effect of culture on fiscal redistribution.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
OLS OLS IV (blood distance
from the UK)
IV (A118G) IV (pathogen
prevalence)
IV (pronoun drop) IV (language)
Panel A: government subsidies and transfers (%GDP)
Individualism 0.273*** 0.195*** 0.360*** 0.312** 0.415*** 0.454*** 0.411*** 0.474*** 0.268*** 0.191** 0.222*** 0.170**
(0.036) (0.044) (0.058) (0.122) (0.062) (0.082) (0.054) (0.127) (0.060) (0.089) (0.054) (0.067)
GDP per capita 1.853*** 0.701 −1.403 −0.887 1.739* 1.947**
(0.532) (1.233) (1.330) (1.303) (0.896) (0.770)
First-stage results
Instrumental variable −15.600*** −7.974*** −1.457*** −1.068*** −23.425*** −14.891*** −27.620*** −17.071*** −22.691*** −17.465***
(2.491) (2.798) (0.330) (0.187) (2.411) (3.674) (5.257) (4.442) (3.447) (2.540)
F-stat 39.22 8.122 19.45 32.76 94.40 16.43 88.35 40.03 43.32 47.29
Observations 83 83 83 83 33 33 83 83 72 72 61 61
R2 0.486 0.543 0.437 0.490 0.297 0.252 0.361 0.244 0.491 0.535 0.516 0.548
Panel B: health and education expenses (%GDP)
Individualism 0.091*** 0.057*** 0.135*** 0.128*** 0.107*** 0.079*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.119*** 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.086***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.019) (0.046) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.030) (0.018) (0.028) (0.015) (0.019)
GDP per capita 0.761*** 0.096 0.838*** 0.234 0.561* 0.567**
(0.195) (0.442) (0.240) (0.302) (0.316) (0.250)
First-stage results
Instrumental variable −15.994*** −8.332*** −1.508*** −1.036*** −23.620*** −15.213*** −27.398*** −17.153*** −21.498*** −16.926***
(2.437) (2.670) (0.318) (0.185) (2.282) (3.620) (5.053) (4.281) (3.408) (2.357)
F-stat 43.08 9.736 22.47 31.21 107.1 17.66 94.83 38.63 39.78 51.56
Observations 91 91 91 91 33 33 91 91 64 64 64 64
R2 0.485 0.578 0.376 0.410 0.577 0.714 0.395 0.473 0.539 0.613 0.563 0.637
Notes: The table shows two panels one for each of the two dependent variables, government subsidies and transfers and health and education expenses. The F-stat is the F
statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
Table 2
The effect of culture on fiscal redistribution: Extended set of controls.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Government subsidies and transfers (%GDP) Health and education expenses (%GDP)
OLS IV (blood distance from the UK) OLS IV (blood distance from the UK)
Individualism 0.184*** 0.222*** 0.103** 0.122** 0.053*** 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.120***
(0.054) (0.074) (0.049) (0.053) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) (0.035)
GDP per capita 0.458 0.341 0.722 0.895 0.885*** 0.376* 0.337 0.413
(1.012) (0.920) (0.668) (0.769) (0.193) (0.226) (0.303) (0.284)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization −4.780* −5.795** −4.834** −4.487** −0.974 −1.283 −1.343 −1.190
(2.594) (2.926) (2.427) (2.230) (0.963) (0.926) (0.908) (0.853)
Population −0.704 −0.900 −0.130 −0.210 −1.019*** −1.360*** −1.435*** −1.502***
(1.175) (1.293) (0.907) (0.912) (0.370) (0.328) (0.410) (0.421)
Population above 65 −0.197 0.023 −0.169 −0.167 0.074 0.027 0.018 0.020
(0.197) (0.191) (0.153) (0.168) (0.052) (0.061) (0.057) (0.056)
Latitude −0.063 0.045 0.014 −0.015 −0.030 −0.048*** −0.058*** −0.074**
(0.068) (0.058) (0.058) (0.071) (0.020) (0.018) (0.022) (0.029)
First-stage results
Instrumental variable −12.884*** −12.076*** −11.359*** −11.752*** −10.656*** −9.632***
(2.485) (2.448) (2.497) (2.280) (2.368) (2.419)
F-stat 26.87 24.34 20.70 26.57 20.25 15.86
Legal origins Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Continent dummies Y N Y Y Y N Y Y
Religion Y N N Y Y N N Y
Observations 68 68 68 68 77 77 77 77
R2 0.847 0.712 0.832 0.841 0.804 0.749 0.741 0.735
Notes: The instrument is the blood distance from the UK. The F-stat is the F statistic for the explanatory power of the excluded instrument in first stage regressions. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses.
* Denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
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